ABSTRACT The publish/subscribe paradigm provides a loosely-coupled and scalable communication model for the large-scale IoT service systems, such as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA). Data confidentiality and service privacy are two crucial security issues for the publish/subscribe model deployed in different domains. The existing access control schemes for such model cannot address both the issues at the same time. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive access control framework (CACF) to bridge this gap. The design principle of the proposed framework is twofold: (a) a bi-directional policy matching scheme for protecting the privacy of IoT services; and (b) a fully homomorphic encryption scheme for encrypting published events to protect data confidentiality. We analyze the correctness and security of the CACF, moreover, we prototype CACF based on Apache ActiveMQ, an open source message broker, and evaluate its performance. The experimental results indicate that our security system meets the latency requirements for very high-quality SCADA services.
I. INTRODUCTION
The communication systems in the existing Internet of Things (IoT) applications [1] , such as smart girds, typically follow a request/reply interaction model, in which access to data is directly controlled by data providers [2] . This tightly-controlled model may not be scalable for large-scale IoT systems. A publish/subscribe model [3] features loose decoupling among event publishers and event subscribers, and can be more appropriate for IoT services communication infrastructure and enable flexible and dynamic collaborations among IoT services [4] , [5] .
In the context of open and wide-area IoT systems, various IoT services from different domains have to interplay for their mutual interests [6] . For example, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems [7] , which act as the core of the power grid, can interact with other services, as shown in Fig.1 . In SCADA, collaborated services mainly include: acquisition & estimation (AE) service (S1),
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo. event analysis (EA) Service (S2), human machine interface (HMI) service (S3), control agent (CA) service (S4), warning service (S5), and the resource model (RM) service (S6). Multiple services are involved in maintaining the distributed control of SCADA. Each service S i (i = 1, . . . , 6) is connected through a notification broker NB i (i = 1, . . . , 6) into the broker network for publishing and subscribing events. A subscribing service describes its event request by ''event type'' or ''event topic'', the NB assumes the final delivery of events produced by a publishing service. The interactions among services depend on the access control policies and the attributes of participating services. In this case, the publisher and the subscriber can be anonymous, multicasting, and indirect.
In this scenario, there are two outstanding security flaws to be resolved [8] - [11] . One is that the published event data may be eavesdropped on by attackers through the pervasive IoT service interactions. The other is that the privacy information of collaborated services may be disclosed during service collaborations. Thus, it is desirable to design an access control scheme to tackle the security and privacy issues related to IoT service interactions from two aspects [12] : (1) from a data perspective, it is necessary to protect the confidentiality of published data to ensure that the broker only delivers the data to qualified subscribers who are interested; (2) from an application perspective, it is necessary to protect the sensitive information of IoT services during collaborations.
Attribute-based access control is one of the most popular access control models [13] , which enables publishers to define access policies to assess whether subscribers are qualified, and subscribers to specify their subscription policies to decide which events are interesting to them. It is difficult to tackle the above security challenges, especially in anonymous, multicast, and indirect service interactions. Following are two reasons: (1) the subscribers do not directly receive events from the publishers, and the publishers cannot directly reject the subscriber's requests on their events; and (2) one event is subscribed by multiple subscribers and different subscribers possibly receive the events from different NBs. Thus, in terms of access to services and their interacting events, it is impossible to execute surveillance for requests by using an omniscient reference monitor as done in the traditional method. Furthermore, most existing access control schemes may not be suitable for such large-scale IoT services collaborations. For example, in a conversation-based access control model [14] , a service checks whether a client has proper credentials before the service starts a new conversation with the client. This indicates that the access control scheme requires direct interaction of the service and the client. In the access control scheme of DDS security standard [15] , the publisher must share a symmetric encryption key with all subscribers. If there are too many subscribers, the use of symmetric keys for enforcing access control can prevent scalability to large-scale IoT service collaborations. In addition, the privacy of subscribers is not protected, since a publisher knows who subscribe to its service.
To bridge the gaps of existing access control schemes for publish/subscribe-based IoT services, we propose a comprehensive access control framework (CACF). In CACF, policies and attributes are first embedded in data and services [16] to preserve the multicast property. Bi-directional policy matching and policy enforcement are crucial to achieving our security goals. Bi-directional Policy matching means that the NB needs to check whether the associated attributes of the published data satisfy the subscription policies specified by subscribers. Meanwhile, the NB needs to check whether the attributes of the subscriber satisfy the access policy associated with the published data. The direct matching can result in privacy information leakage. Thus an attribute encoding approach is used in CACF. Policy enforcement is based on fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme [17] . In previous works, security approaches [8] , [9] , [18] have focused on the confidentiality of data. Privacy-protection approaches [19] - [21] have focused on preserving service privacy. To the best of our knowledge, few existing approaches can holistically protect data confidentiality and services privacy at the same time.
In this work, our proposed CACF not only supports data confidentiality protection and homomorphic operations on encrypted data, but also access control for IoT services. Moreover, the publisher and the subscriber in our framework do not need to share any key, reducing key management burdens of publishers. We choose Apache ActiveMQ as JMS broker [22] and extend it to perform policy evaluation. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose a comprehensive access control framework for collaborative IoT services. The framework allows the publishers and subscribers to control the event data by the bi-directional policy matching between protection requirements and services' capabilities.
• Bi-directional policy matching and policy enforcement are designed to embrace the proposed framework. As the first component, attribute encoding and anonymousset-based principle are adopted to provide service privacy. As the second component, a fully homomorphic encryption scheme is adopted to protect data confidentiality.
• We analyze the correctness and security of our framework by proving that qualified subscribers can access encrypted events, while unqualified subscribers cannot access the events even if they are allowed to collude. We implement a prototype of the framework and evaluate its performance from the perspective of data delivery latency for different sizes of event data, different numbers of policies, and different numbers of attributes on the subscribers. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the FHE scheme used in our framework and overviews the algebraic structure of authorization policies. In Section III, we present the detailed construction process of our CACF. We present correctness and security analysis of our solution in Section IV and performance evaluation in Section V. Section VI review the related work. Section VII concludes this paper and points out future research.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we describe the fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme, defined in [17] , and attribute-based access control model to be used in the proposed framework.
A. FULLY HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
In our CACF, events are encrypted with an FHE scheme which supports homomorphic operations on encrypted events. The key switching operation provides an efficient way of re-encrypting events for particular subscribers.
Let q be a prime, Z q an integer domain modulo q, and n an integer. The FHE scheme FHE we use is a symmetric encryption scheme, FHE contains the following operations:
FHE.SecKey(q, n): It takes the parameter q and n as the input to generate a secret key K .
FHE.PubKey(K ): It takes a secret key K as the input to generate a public key PK .
FHE.Enc(K , v):
To encrypt a, it outputs an n-dimensional
It takes two ciphertexts C 1 = (c 11 , . . . , c 1n ), and C 2 = (c 21 , . . . , c 2n ) encrypted under the same key 
Given a secret key K p of a publisher and a public key PK s of a subscriber, FHE also contains the generating algorithm of a switching key, which is used to convert a ciphertext encrypted with K p into a ciphertext under K s , which is the secret key of the subscriber. The work in [23] gives the steps of generating the switching key. In the following, we describe the property of the switching key and re-encryption.
Let KeySwitch(PK s , K p ) = SW be the operation of generating the switching key SW = {SW 1 , . . . , SW n }, and each SW i is a n-dimensional vector. Suppose Dec(K p , (c 1 , . . . , c n )) = v. Then, the re-encryption of C = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) with SW , denoted by ReEnc(SW , C), is defined by the expression (c 1 
The correctness of the key switching is analyzed in [23] . Note that our framework can also use other FHE schemes, such as the scheme proposed in [24] and [25] .
B. ATTRIBUTE-BASED AUTHORIZATION POLICY
In this paper, we adopt the attribute-based access control model. An attribute w can be written as an attribute-value pair (nm, val), i.e., the attribute nm has the value val. The attribute conjunction can be expressed as w 1 ∧ · · · ∧ w m , i.e., a subscriber has the attributes w 1 , . . . , w m , where ''∧ is a logical ''AND'' operator, and ''∨ is a logical ''OR'' operator.
Given an event topic tp, a policy for this topic uses attributes to specify the subscribers which are qualified to access the data of topic tp.
Definition 1: An authorization policy is represented as
, meaning that a subscriber can access the data of topic tp if it has at least one set of the conjunctive attributes from w 11 ∧ · · · ∧ w 1m to w n1 ∧ · · · ∧ w nm .
The attributes of a subscriber are represented as γ = (w 11 ∧ · · ·∧w 1m )∨· · ·∨(w k1 ∧· · ·∧w km ), meaning that the subscriber has k different sets of conjunctive attributes. If at least one set of conjunctive attributes in γ also appears in tp , then we say γ satisfies tp . We assume the attributes of a subscriber are linked to its public key and can be known to the publishers and brokers. A Bloom Filter is a simple, space-efficient, and randomized data structure for representing a set of strings compactly for efficient membership query [9] . In our framework, an access control policy is encoded into bloom filters and sent as part of access credentials when publishing an encrypted event. For tp , we will generate n bloom filters for each set of the conjunctive attributes. The operation genBF (w i1 ∧ · · · ∧ w im ) generates the bloom filter that can check the membership for m attributes w i1 ,. . . , w im .
III. THE CONSTRUCTION OF CACF
In this section, we first present an overview of the CACF architecture, and then present the detailed matching procedure and access control procedure in CACF.
A. CACF ARCHITECTURE
Our CACF architecture has three layers, as illustrated in Fig. 2 . The upper layer and the bottom layer assume the privacy protection function of application services; the two layers correspond to bi-directional policy matching operations between the protection requirements and capabilities of services. The middle layer assumes the confidentiality protection function of published events, corresponding to policy enforcement operation. These operations are performed by different collaborating services, as shown in Fig. 3 . We describe these services as follows.
1) PUBLISHING SERVICE
A publishing service consists of three important modules: authorization centre, policy translator, and encryption. It firstly publishes an event announcement on a notification broker for an event type and attached policies, which provides event access to subscribing services through the broker. The authorization centre is in charge of managing attributes and access control policies in CACF. Before publishing the event on the broker, two steps are performed. The policy translator module firstly generates and assigns access credentials for each valid subscriber, the generation of access credentials are based on attributes of authorized subscribers and access control policies of protecting published event. Then the VOLUME 7, 2019 encryption module encrypts the published event under its specified access control policies.
2) BROKER
The broker has three modules: policy matching, keyswitching, and event routing. It is responsible for storing the published event and providing event access services to subscribers based on their requested event types. In particular, according to a service message and the authorization request, the broker first finds the access control policy through an event type. If the type of the subscribed event is part of the received event, the policy matching module takes charge of checking whether the subscriber's attributes satisfy policies of the newly published event. If the matching results are not empty, then the subscriber is a valid consumer. For the valid subscriber, the policy matching module also evaluates whether attributes of the published event can satisfy the subscription policies specified by subscribers. If the results are true, the keyswitching module re-encrypts the encrypted event before routing the published event through the event routing module.
3) SUBSCRIBING SERVICE
Before sending its authorization request by an event type, each subscribing service specifies the subscription policies for protecting its own sensitive information, such that the subscribing service only receives the event whose attributes meet the subscription policies of the service. The subscribing service has a secret key which is used to re-decrypt and decrypt the routed event by the decryption module.
In CACF, an authorization procedure and a data dissemination procedure are illustrated in Fig. 3 . The detailed steps are as follows: (1) a publisher publishes the event prefix announcement; (2) a subscriber expresses its authorization request by an event type; (3) according to the authorization request, the publisher generates and sends access credentials to the broker; (4) the publisher publishes encrypted events of the subscribed type. After receiving encrypted events, the broker first decides whether the subscriber is an authorized subscriber. For the valid subscriber, its broker switches the encrypted event under the publisher's secret key into the event ciphertext under the subscriber's public key. (5) According to the event routing module of the notification broker, the event is forwarded to the subscribing service. Later, the subscribing service can recover the event through a decryption module.
In our work, there are two security hypotheses. First, the public/secret keys and public parameters that are used in the CACF are assigned by the certificate authority. Second, the notification brokers are honest-but-curious. They follow the protocol to check bi-directional policy matching and transform encrypted event, but they can also be curious about the published event and subscribers' interest. Third, publishing services are honest. However, in practice, subscribing services can be dishonest. They may attempt to access unauthorized events by colluding with each other or with the broker.
Among collaborative IoT services, there is a manyto-many relationship among multiple publishers and subscribers. In this section, we take one publisher and one subscriber to describe the access control procedure in our framework. Here we assume that a publisher P publishes an event with a type tp. Its access expression is denoted by a propositional formula , where
. Let a subscriber S have an attribute conjunction γ = (w 11 ∧· · ·∧w 1m )∨· · ·∨(w t1 ∧· · ·∧w tm ). The process of finding the event type is obvious. In order to realize functions of each part, authorization policies and attributes are encoded to support rapid matching. Then a method of masking the attributes and policies is used to preserve service privacy. The attribute-based encryption scheme is last applied to support the scalable access control framework. In the following sections, we will present the matching technology and methods, as well as policy enforcement procedure in detail.
B. MATCHING PROCEDURE
For one event type, its authorization policy includes multiple attribute conjunctions, and different attribute conjunctions may have a different length. For different subscribers, they may have different attribute conjunctions, and the lengths of attribute conjunctions may be different. In our work, we assume the length of each attribute conjunction in an authorization policy is the same as the length of each subscriber's attribute conjunction. The core idea of checking the bi-directional policy matching is to check whether the attributes of subscribers are included in that of the authorization policy, as illustrated in Fig. 4 . Here, we present the basic bi-directional policy matching ideal and matching procedure, correctness proof and security analysis of policy matching scheme have been discussed in [19] .
Directly matching between attributes and policies would lead to the leakage of some critical information. Before realizing the first-layer matching, we encode the attributes of subscribers, and encode the attributes in the access policy conjunctions. In order to keep clear attributes unknown to adversaries, these attributes are encoded into anonymous attribute sets. Policy encoding is to encode a set of attributes which are included in attribute conjunction, into a hash value using a one-way set hash. A Bloom Filter (BF) is used to implement this function. 
For example, for the
i − th (1 ≤ i ≤ n) access conjunction i in , where i = w i1 ∧. . .∧w im , the attributes in i form a set W i = {w i1 , w i2 , . . . , w im }. For each w il ∈ W i (1 ≤ l ≤ m),(1 ≤ k ≤ n − m) is included in
C. ACCESS CONTROL PROCEDURE
The access control procedure contains three phrases: initial phrase, policy authorization phrase and policy enforcement phrase. Assume a publisher P has a key pair (pk p , sk p ), and a subscriber S has a key pair (pk s , sk s ). The data flow in CACF is illustrated in Fig. 5 .
At the initial phase of the access control procedure, for each type of event e, P chooses a random number r e as a temporary identifier, where r e is bigger than the event e. P chooses another random number r p as a policy identifier, h is a hash function used in CACF. The authorization phase consists of sending a subscription request by the subscriber (Phase 1) and generating the access credentials (Phase 2). The policy enforcement phase involves publishing events by publisher (Phase 3), policy matching (Phase 4), key switching (Phase 5) and sending converted ciphertext for enabling event access by the broker (Phase 6), as well as event decryption by the subscriber (Phase 7).
Phase 1: Before sending an authorization request to a type of event tp, the subscriber first specifies the subscription policy over the requested event type tp, and then the subscriber encodes its subscription policy and each attribute into BF k j , respectively.
Phase 2: For each allowed requested event type tp, the publisher P chooses a random number r tp to randomize each attribute conjunction w i1 ∧ . . . ∧ w im (1 ≤ i ≤ n) in tp , such that h tp = h(w i1 |w i2 | . . . |w im |r tp ), where ''| is a connector. Even though other types of events may have the same attribute conjunctions in their policies, h tp will be different given the random number r tp . Meanwhile, the publisher P creates an access credential AC that will be sent to the broker, the generation of the credential is independent of each attribute conjunction w i1 ∧ . . . For each attribute conjunction γ j = w j1 ∧ . . . ∧ w jm in γ , P chooses a new random number r p ,
At the end of the authorization phase, the access credential AC is sent to the broker at which S is registered.
Phase 3: Before P publishes an event e with the type tp to a broker, P encrypts the event e under a new random number r 0 for e to get the ciphertext C p , then C p = Enc(sk p , e + r e · r 0 ).
Phase 4:
When the broker receives an encrypted event C p from P to S, it checks for matching by the equation
That is to say, the broker checks whether the subscriber has an attribute conjunction γ j in γ that satisfies i ∈ . If the matching result is positive, then the subscription request is allowed. The subscriber is a qualified (or authorized) user.
Phase 5: For the qualified subscriber S, the broker converts C p under P's public key into the event ciphertext C p under S's public key by using the keyswitching operation in the FHE. Beyond that, the broker converts the access credential AC for enabling S's access by using the keyswitching operation and homomorphic operations in the FHE, where the converted event ciphertext
The converted results of the access credential include C s and C s , where C s = ReEnc(SW p→s , C p2 ) ⊕ C s3 = Enc(pk s , h tp + r e ), C s = ReEnc(SW p→s , C p1 ) = Enc(pk s , r tp ).
Phase 6:
The broker sends event ciphertexs (C p , C s , C s ) to its subscriber S for enabling S's access.
The event e can be recovered by decrypting C p to obtain e + r e · r 0 , and then conducting the modulo operation e + r e · r 0 (mod r e ) to remove r e · r 0 .
Phase 7: Upon receiving C p , C s , and C s from the broker, S can easily recover r e from the access credentials. S first decrypts C p1 and obtains the random r tp , meaning that the identifier r tp of the event type tp should be used in the decryption. Because γ j satisfies i , γ j is equal to w i = w i1 ∧. . .∧w im , S can decrypt ciphertext C s to obtain the random number r e . The steps are
At least, S decrypts C s to obtain e + r e · r 0 , and recovers e through a modulo operation with respect to r e .
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
In this section, we first analyze the correctness of our CACF, and then analyze the properties of the security and privacy of our proposed CACF with the following theorems. From Fig. 6 , we can obtain b = 1100 . . . 00, that is {w i1 , w i2 } ⊆ Set a , i.e., W j ⊆ W i . Therefore, the bi-directional policy matching scheme is correct.
Theorem 2 (Authorization Correctness):
For the policy of an event e with a type tp and an attribute conjunction γ of VOLUME 7, 2019 a subscriber S, if w i1 = w j1 ,. . . , and w im = w jm , then S can access all events of topic tp in CACF.
Proof: ), C s3 }), the broker will create SW p→s , {C p1 , C p2 , C s3 } for S. According to the keyswitching and decryption operations, S can get r tp . Next, S can recover the event e by decrypting C p to obtain e+r e ·r 0 , and then conducting the modulo operation e + r e · r 0 (mod r e ) to remove r e · r 0 .
The subscriber can successfully obtain the requested event if its attributes match the publisher's authorization policy. Analogously, we can prove that the subscriber accepts the subscribed event from the published event type if the event attributes match the subscriber's subscription policy.
B. SECURITY & PRIVACY ANALYSIS
For the application layers, the bi-directional policy matching scheme keeps non-interaction CPA security. That is to say, if two different attribute conjunctions have nonoverlapping attributes, then any adversary is unable to distinguish the encodings of the two attribute conjunctions. The detailed proof of non-interaction CPA security can be referred to [19] .
For the data layer, our CACF ensures that only authorized subscribers can access the events. In other words, only subscribers whose attributes satisfy the authorization policy of publishers, can access the events. Besides, CACF can resist network attacks such as spoofing attacks, man-in-themiddle attacks and compromised-key attacks. Thus, we will analyze the following types of possible security attacks: (1) collusion attacks: two subscribing services collude to recover the event that they cannot individually access, (2) a broker uses the stored access credentials to access the secret event, (3) spoofing attacks, (4) man-in-the-middle attacks, and (5) compromised-key attacks.
Theorem 3: CACF resists collusion attacks. Proof: For two subscribing services S 1 and S 2 , if both S 1 and S 2 cannot access the event e, then S 1 and S 2 will not collude to recover the event e. Since S 1 's and S 2 's attributes do not satisfy the access policy of e individually, the broker cannot verify policy matching equation
successfully. Thus, the publisher will not generate access credentials for them, and the broker will not switch the encrypted event. If the collusion of S 1 and S 2 makes the publisher P generate C p1 , C p2 and C s3 for S 1 , and C p1 , C p2 and C s3 for S 2 ; S 1 and S 2 will not recover e successfully. Because the attribute conjunction of S 1 (or S 2 ) is not equal to the corresponding attribute conjunction w i = w i1 + w i2 + . . . + w im , the broker will not obtain C s = ReEnc(SW p→s , C p2 ) ⊕ C s3 = Enc(pk s , h tp + r e ) through homomorphic operations. r e and r p are secret, thus S 1 and S 2 cannot recover the event e.
Theorem 4:
The broker resists using the stored access credentials to access the secret event.
Proof: The broker can perform the keyswitching operations by using the stored switching key SK p→s . It first switch event ciphertext C p = Enc(sk p , e + r e · r 0 ) to the ciphertext C p = Enc(pk s , e + r e · r 0 ). The broker then removes the random number r p and embedded attributes from the event ciphertext C p through the homomorphic addition operations C s = ReEnc(SW p→s , C p2 ) ⊕ C s3 = Enc(pk s , h tp + r e ) Last, the broker converts the secret r tp under P's public key into the secret r tp under S's public key, i.e., C s = ReEnc(SW p→s , C p1 ) = Enc(pk s , r tp ). However, the broker does not have the private key of the subscriber S, and it cannot receive the random number r tp and recover the random h tp which is used in the hash function on attributes. Thus, the broker will not obtain the random number r e and recover the event e, preventing the curious behaviour of the broker from leaking secret information.
Theorem 5: CACF resists spoofing attacks. Proof: Our framework adopts a general authentication method to assess the identity of subscribers. There are four types of spoofing attacks. First, a subscriber S cannot fake its identity to get the information of event e, because the system needs to verify the identity of S when S sends a subscription request with an event type tp. Second, the broker cannot fake the access credentials stored on it to recover event e, because the broker does not have any private keys of the subscribers to remove random numbers and decrypt ciphertexts. Third, two subscribers S 1 and S 2 cannot collude with each other to get the unauthorized event e, because P generates the switching key for each authorized subscriber. Event if S 1 and S 2 have qualified attributes according to the policy, the broker will not have a switching key to convert an encrypted event for them. Lastly, the broker colludes with the subscribers to mislead publishers to get some secret information by itself or send any ciphertext to any broker. For this spoofing attack, we cannot prevent it. Thus, we assume that the broker is honest-butcurious and does not collude with subscribers.
Theorem 6: CACF resists man-in-the-middle attacks. Proof: First, the attacker cannot replace the broker with access credentials with a broker without any credential to make an unauthorized subscriber to get secret information of event e. If P authorizes S 1 to access to the event e and does not authorize S 2 to access e, the broker of S 2 replaces the broker with access credentials (SW p→s ,
), C s3 }) for S 1 . SW p→s does not convert the encrypted event to S 2 . S 2 cannot get the information of e. Second, multiple brokers team up to act as a broker to forge the access credential of S 1 , because there are different random numbers for different attribute conjunctions, i.e., for each attribute conjunction w i1 ∧. . .∧w im from the policy of P. P chooses a new random number r tp and generates h tp = h(w i1 |w i2 | . . . brokers, the notification broker will have unsuccessful bloom filter checks. Hence, the broker will not convert the encrypted event and access credentials for them. Thus, S 1 still cannot get additional information.
Theorem 7: CACF resists compromised-key attack.
Proof: When the private key of a subscriber is compromised, this does not have an impact on other subscribers. If both S 1 and S 2 are authorized to subscribe the event e published by P, the broker generates switching keys SW p→s 1 for S 1 and SW p→s 2 for S 2 ; i.e., S 1 and S 2 do not need to share keys. Thus, if the secret key of S 1 is compromised, it will not affect receiving event e for S 2 .
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Based on Apache ActiveMQ [26] which is a messageoriented Java Message Service (JMS) broker, we have prototyped CACF. The performance of the prototype is evaluated.
A. IMPLEMENTATION & CONFIGURATION
All experiments are performed in a distributed setup, where the detailed configuration used in our tests is shown in Fig. 7 . To evaluate precisely in a publish/subscribe system, both publisher clients and subscriber clients ran on the same computer with the configuration of 3.0G of RAM, Intel 1.87GHz CPUs. Windows7_32 operating system. The broker ran on another server equipped with 4.0G of RAM and Intel 3.2GHz CPUs, again Windows7_32 operating system was used. All servers are connected via a standard 100Mbps LAN.
Due to the real-time communication requirement in a publish/subscribe-based IoT service system, we adopt a fully homomorphic encryption scheme described in [17] , which can encrypt large integers efficiently. In this scheme, we chose a random prime as the encryption modulus, where the size of the random prime is larger than 5K bytes. Thus, the encrypted event data can be 5K bytes.
In our experimental tests, we extended Apache ActiveMQ with the policy matching capability and the key switching capability. The framework is shown in Fig. 8 . The broker is responsible for: (1) checking matching between the authorization policies and attributes of each published event and each subscribing service; (2) key switching for converting the encrypted events from the publisher to the re-encrypted events, which is then decrypted by the subscriber; (3) filtering event by routing events to the authorized subscribers.
To save effort, we extend the publish/subscribe system with building in CACF as the ''secure publish/subscribe system''. Latency and throughput are chosen as the main performance metrics in our evaluation. Here, we consider the following three types of latency:
• Pub-to-Sub Latency without CACF (Baseline), which is defined as the entire devotion in generating an event from its publisher to its subscriber, including the time spent in finding the event type on the broker.
• Pub-to-Sub Latency with CACF (Sec Pub/Sub), which consists of the whole time spent in the basic event processing (i.e., baseline), as well as the time spent in building CACF. The latency includes (1) the latency of performing encryption operations on the event publisher; (2) the latency of performing key switching operations and performing matching operations on the broker; and (3) the latency of the decryption operation on the subscriber.
• Throughput, is defined to be the average number of the published events in one second. To evaluate the overhead of event communication from publishers to subscribers and the scalability of the secure publish/subscribe system, we measure the latency in the baseline and the secure publish/subscribe system by the experiments in three specified test cases: 1) Evaluating the latency in terms of the increasing size of a published event; 2) Evaluating the latency in terms of the increasing number of authorization policies in an event; 3) Evaluating the latency in terms of the increasing number of attributes in policy for the subscriber.
B. EVALUATION RESULTS
In our tests, we measure the average latency for an event under different sizes of event data, different numbers of policies in an event and different numbers of rules at a subscriber. We compare these latency metrics between the baseline and the proposed secure publish/subscribe system (sec pub/sub). All test cases run 1000 times. The other parameters of each experimental test are summarized in Table 1 .
In the first test, we vary the sizes of event data from 1KB to 5KB, and fix one policy and one attribute at the broker, the test result is shown in Fig. 9 . From the figure, we can see that the Pub-to-Sub latency of sec pub/sub is about 37ms ∼ 42ms, the latency increases by about 12ms, as compared to the baseline.
In the second test, for 1KB data event, we measure the average latency with two attributes on the subscriber, the average latency with different numbers of policies 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 on the horizontal axis is shown in Fig. 10 . From the figure, we can see that the Pub-to-Sub latency of sec pub/sub is about 38ms ∼ 45ms, the latency increases by about 14ms, as compared to the baseline. This latency is a little higher than the latency of the first test, since the second test has more attributes than the first test.
In the third test, for 1KB data event with 10 policies, we measure the average latency with different numbers of attributes on one subscriber, as shown in Fig. 11 . From  Fig. 11 , we can see that the Pub-to-Sub latency of sec pub/sub is about 39ms ∼ 46ms, the latency increases by about 16ms, as compared to the baseline. As the number of attributes increases, the latency exhibits a continuous curve. This latency is increasingly faster than the previous two test cases, since it takes more time to check matching.
By means of the ''Little's Law'', the throughput in Events Per Second (EPS) can be derived as ''Throughput = 1 Latency ''. Based on the average pub-to-sub latencies and the latencies of the baseline, we present the average sustainable pub-to-sub throughput results in Fig. 12 .
The pub-to-sub throughput results are based on the average pub-to-sub latencies with or without access control. Fig. 12 shows the average sustainable throughput in processing events per second using different event sizes; the horizontal axis is in base-10 logarithm. The size of the data event is one of the main factors that affect pub-tosub latencies. With the growth of data event sizes, the pubto-sub throughput decreases, that is to say, fewer data events per second can be sent from the publisher to the subscriber.
From the above security analysis and latency evaluation results, the overhead incurred for preserving the publish/subscribe system is reasonable and acceptable. The overall latency comparison shows that our access control framework has higher policy matching efficiency and higher scalability.
VI. RELATED WORK AND DISCUSSION
In the context of publish/subscribe systems, the security requirements mainly include the privacy of participant services, the data confidentiality and access control. There are extensive studies [9] , [18] - [21] , [27] , [28] on these security issues of publish/subscribe services.
The cryptographic encryption solution is one of privacypreserving techniques used in distributed systems. Depending on Ciphertext Policy Attribute based Encryption (CP-ABE), Tariq et al. [29] propose an access control scheme for a brokerless publish/subscribe system, in which each publisher and subscriber has a separate private key and a public key for the authorization credential. The work described in [30] studies on preserving subscription privacy in publish/subscribe systems, which is limited to fine-grained access control for the published event. Opyrchal and Prakash [31] focus on publication privacy in publish/subscribe systems by providing access control on publications. Ion et al. [32] propose an access control framework by combining an attribute-based encryption scheme and a multi-user searchable data encryption scheme. This framework allows multiple users to encrypt data and to make queries. However, these solutions require participant services to coordinate to establish the encryption and decryption keys, and the network broker should decrypt the event from its publisher and then encrypt it again for sending to the subscribers.
Homomorphic encryption [33] is a novel approach for preserving privacy in publish/subscribe systems. It supports complex computation conducted on the broker, but it is not practical. With the Ring-LWE (RLWE) key switching approach from the homomorphic encryption, Yuriy et al. [34] propose two IND-CPA-secure multi-hop unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) schemes. The schemes keep the decoupling features of publishers and subscribers, as well as preventing the broker access to the unprotected event. These security schemes focus on the privacy of subscription or the privacy of publishers, and rarely support comprehensive privacy protection of published events and the subscription at the same time.
Goyal et al. [35] provide a Key-Policy ABE scheme, which allowed the policies (attached to keys) to be expressed by any monotonic formula over encrypted attributes (ciphertext). Waters [36] propose the Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Encryption (CP-ABE) scheme, where any encryptor is allowed to specify access control by using any access formula on the attributes in the system. However, in these approaches, the CP-ABE scheme embeds authorization policies into ciphertexts. Such security schemes in publish/subscribe systems require that a publisher has many keys, where each publisher gives the subscriber a key. It does not allow for using notification brokers to reduce the key management burden of the participant, and does not preserve the decoupling feature between service providers and consumers.
The differential privacy technique is adopted to resolve the privacy and security of users' data in [28] , with focus on uncertain datasets of users. The DDS security standards [15] include an access control DDS-AC scheme for publish/subscribe systems. A publisher in DDS-AC can set up topic domains, and decide whether a subscriber can join the domain to access events. DDS-AC adopts the traditional access control method and assumes that there is an omniponent supervisor to supervise access to data. This requires authorization delegation. In our solution, there is no such an assumption or limitation.
This paper is a continuation of our work [27] , where a data-centric access control framework (DCACF) is given and data confidentiality is thoroughly addressed. Based on DCACF, we add the description of embedding policy and preserving policy. Different from these studies, in this paper, we focus on security requirements of privacy-preserving and confidentiality-protecting aspects. In publish/subscribebased IoT services communication, we adopt policy encoding and matching techniques, as well as fully homomorphic encryption scheme, to achieve our security goals.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The publish/subscribe paradigm provides a loosely-coupled and scalable communication model for collaborative IoT services. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive access control framework, CACF, for publish/subscribebased IoT services communication. Our framework preserves the data confidentiality by adopting the FHE scheme which supports homomorphic operations on encrypted data. Then, we adopt privacy-preserving matching technology on the access policy specified by publishing services and the subscription policy specified by subscribing services. In our framework, our security solution preserves the direct, anonymous, and multicast features of publish/subscribe services. There is no need to share keys between collaborative services, which reduces the burden of key management. We demonstrate that CACF is correct and secure in the standard model. The performance evaluation results show that our comprehensive framework can provide the privacy-preserving and confidentiality-protecting capabilities with acceptable latency.
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